Islamic Revolution Research

Abstract The entry of Iran into the phase of modernization during the Second Pahlavi era was accompanied by a structural rupture and a clear tension with prior traditions. While in the West, modernization generally emerged from internal transformations, political institutionalization, and the gradual expansion of social participation, in Iran this process relied predominantly on oil revenues and a rentier economy. This characteristic had a profound impact on the nature of the political and on the formation of social identity in Iran.

Accordingly, the central research question of this study may be framed as follows: How did the rentier economy and the state-led modernization project during the Second Pahlavi era shape social identity and the formation of the political in Iran?

This research assumes that the oil-based economy of this period led to a concentration of power in the hands of the state and to the weakening of civil institutions. Consequently, modern identity did not emerge organically but was artificially constructed, producing not social cohesion but instead a profound rift between state and society.

Ultimately, through qualitative analysis of the data, it becomes clear that modernization under the Second Pahlavi could not generate a sustainable social identity or a legitimate political foundation, precisely because it was not rooted in genuine popular will or participation. The result was the emergence of a “fragmented and crisis-ridden identity” within a society that appeared modern on the surface but was, in essence, afflicted by cultural alienation and spiritual dislocation. This profound internal contradiction eventually gave rise to widespread discontent, constituting one of the key factors behind the 1979 Revolution. The experience of this period demonstrates unequivocally that genuine and lasting modernization cannot be achieved solely through financial capital and state-driven infrastructural projects.

Abstract On the eve of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian student movement underwent a strategic transformation from armed struggle to civil resistance. Despite nearly two decades of guerrilla activities among students, the central research problem lies in explaining this fundamental transition. The main research question is: "What factors and mechanisms caused the student movement's pattern of struggle to shift from radical armed action to nonviolent civil resistance in the final years of the Pahlavi era?" To address this, a historical-analytical method has been employed, drawing on library sources, while data have been analyzed within Gene Sharp's "civil resistance" framework and the structural-agency approach.
The findings reveal three key factors: the failure of guerrilla groups to gain mass support; the expansion of civil society and intermediary institutions (clergy, religious intellectuals, bazaar merchants, and workers); and the transformation of student discourse under the influence of Shari'ati's ideas and symbolic practices such as the Goethe Nights. By employing Sharp's three strategies—protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention—the movement succeeded in transforming its pattern of struggle into inclusive collective action.
This strategic transition was not a tactical adjustment but rather the outcome of simultaneous transformations at three levels: agents (guerrilla failure), institutions (civil society expansion), and discourse (reformist religious thought). The study demonstrates that answering the research question is possible through explaining the complex interplay of prior strategic failure, changing political opportunities, and identity redefinition within the civil resistance framework